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UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL WARS
LOUIS FISHERt
With studied care and deliberation, the Framers of the Constitu-
tion created a structure to prevent presidential wars. They specifically
rejected the British model that allowed the monarch to take the coun-
try to war and to exercise exclusive control over foreign policy. Mak-
ing fundamental judgments about representative government, popu-
lar control, and human nature, they placed the power of war and
peace with the legislative branch and divided foreign policy between
the President and Congress. For the most part, the Framers' model
prevailed from 1789 to 1950.
That constitutional system is in tatters. Because of presidential
initiatives after World War II-aggravated by congressional acquies-
cence and judicial passivity-there is no effective check on presiden-
tial wars. Presidents claim they can go to war wherever they like, for
whatever reason, without seeking authority from Congress. What the
Framers feared and tried to avoid we now have: unilateral presiden-
tial warmaking.
President Truman's decision to go to war against North Korea in
1950 represented a subversion of the Framers' design.' For the first
time, a president had involved the nation in a major war without seek-
ing a declaration or authorization from Congress. Over the last dec-
ade, Congress has stayed on the sidelines watching Presidents George
Bush and Bill Clinton engage militarily against Panama, Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Congress did
authorize war against Iraq in 1991, but since that time the scope of
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INT'L L. 21, 21-22 (1995) (discussing whether Truman acted contrary to the Constitu-
tion).
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military operations against that country has been dictated by presi-
dents, not Congress.
Political developments over this past half century do little to sup-
port the Framers' expectation that each branch of government would
protect itself by fighting off usurpations and transgressions by other
branches. The contemporary Congress has abdicated war powers that
had been entrusted to the legislative branch-the people's represen-
tatives. The legislative check has been reduced to possibly taking
some future action to deny funds for an unpopular war started by the
President. Thejudicial check, for the most part, does not exist.
Part I of this Article addresses the Framers' design for the Ameri-
can government, focusing on what they had learned from the colonial
governments and the delegate debates over the use of checks and bal-
ances. Part II discusses the Framers' intent in giving Congress the
power to initiate war. Part III provides a brief description of the
Framers' model in practice while describing instances, even before
1950, where presidents initiated the use of force without congres-
sional approval. In Part IV, I analyze Professor John Yoo's argument
that the Framers' intent was to give the President the initiative in war.
Part V focuses on the application of the War Powers doctrine to
Kosovo and presidential reliance on U.N. Security Council resolutions
and NATO decisions as "authority."
I. THE FRAMERS' DESIGN
The Framers believed that a powerful dynamic of institutional self-
defense would safeguard the structure of separation of powers and
give life and energy to the system of checks and balances. They ex-
pected Congress to be especially vigilant in protecting the power to go
to war. Their model worked for about 160 years, but the record since
1950 reveals an alarming decline in congressional confidence and in-
stitutional self-esteem. Lawmakers regularly deride the capacity of
Congress to exercise its war and spending p. 2Congessto r its  ingprerogatives. What the
Framers had in mind clearly is not working today. Citizens need to
understand what has happened, and why, and debate whether the
original constitutional principles are worth preserving.
James Madison argued in Federalist No. 51 that
the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
See generally LouIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING
(forthcoming 2000).
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department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in
this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of at-
tack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
The core principle: each branch would defend its prerogatives.
Madison asked how the partition of power among the three branches
would be maintained. Acknowledging that other systems had been
inadequate, he stated that "the defect must be supplied, by so contriv-
ing the interior structure of the government as that its several con-
stituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping
each other in their proper places."4
The Framers depended on a written constitution, representative
government, and democratic pressures, but they wanted more. Madi-
son agreed that a "dependence on the people is, no doubt, the pri-
mary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind
the necessity of auxiliary precautions."5 The auxiliary precautions:
separation of powers, checks and balances, and each branch intent on
safeguarding its institutional interests.
We have it from Woodrow Wilson that the makers of the Constitu-
tion "followed the scheme as they found it expounded in Montes-
quieu, followed it with genuine scientific enthusiasm."6 James Bryce
argued that the Framers "had for their oracle of political philosophy
the treatise of Montesquieu on the Spirit of Laws.... No general
principle of politics laid such hold on the constitution-makers and
statesmen of America as the dogma that the separation of these three
functions is essential to freedom."7 Montesquieu was indeed fre-
quently cited at the Federal Convention and the state ratifying con-
ventions, and Madison praised him as "the celebrated Montesquieu"
and the "oracle" who was always consulted on the separation doc-
trine.8
The American Framers did not borrow the separation doctrine
s THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
4 Id. at 355.
s I& at 356.
6 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTTUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56
(1908).
1 JAMES BRYCE, TM AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 29-30 (MacMillan 3d ed.
1908)(1893).
8 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 337 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961).
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from Montesquieu, who presented a tidy, uncomplicated model of
separate branches, free of partisan battles and the evolving cabinet
system in England. Montesquieu promoted an idealized form of gov-
ernment, corresponding more to his conceptions-or misconcep-
tions-than to the reality of British politics. Justice Holmes spoke
bluntly of this contrivance: "His England-the England of the three-
fold division of power into legislative, executive and judicial-was a
fiction invented by him, a fiction which misled Blackstone and De-
lolme."' °
For the most part, Montesquieu adhered to a strict separation of
powers. He maintained that the legislative body should not impeach
the executive, for the "moment he is accused or tried there is an end
of liberty."" He gave his "senate" (the house of nobles) the power to
reject bills relating to supplies (funding), but no authority to amend
12them. He allowed the executive a veto to reject legislation but op-
posed any other participation in the legislative process. On all those
points, and others, the Framers rejected Montesquieu. Yet they
agreed on his fundamental premise that power must check power: "il
faut que, par la disposition des choses, le pouvoir arrite le pouvoir. '4
A. Lessons Learned at Home
Colonial governments in America accumulated their own insights
into the problem of checks and balances. During this period, com-
plaints about institutional encroachments were common. After
achieving their independence from England, many of the states wrote
into their constitutions explicit guarantees for a separation between
the branches of government, but the meaning of separation varied
9 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 243-51 (1972) (arguing that Mon-
tesquieu based his model for separated powers on the British Constitution but was
heavily criticized because the branches of the British government have been consis-
tentl, linked).
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 263 (1920).
1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 158 (Thomas Nugent
trans., 1949).
12 See id. at 156 (arguing that members of the legislative body should only be al-
lowed to reject, and not resolve, legislation so that the interests of the people are not
forgotten).
3 See id. at 159-60 ("If the prince (executive) were to have a part in the legislature
by the power of resolving, liberty would be lost.").
14 "It is necessary that, by the nature of things, power check power." The French is
taken from Montesquieu's collected works, 2 MONTESQUIEU, OEUVRES COMPI±TES 395
(1951).
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from state to state and became a source of continual misunderstand-
ing. For example, despite the strong language in the Massachusetts
Constitution forbidding one department from exercising the powers
of another, the executive possessed a qualified veto over the legisla-
ture; the senate acted as a court of impeachment; members of the ju-
diciary were appointed by the governor; and the legislature appointed
the major generals of the militia, an advisory council for the governor,
and several officers of the administration. s
Other state constitutions announced separation in strict terms but
departed from the maxim when necessary. New Hampshire, the last
of the thirteen states to form a constitution, prudently acknowledged
the gap between a literal interpretation of separated powers and the
demands of workable government. The three departments were to be
kept "as separate from and independent of each other, as the nature
of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of
connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one in-
dissoluble bond of union and amity."
16
In the months just before the Philadelphia Convention, Madison
identified for Thomas Jefferson the essential elements of the new na-
tional government, including a reorganization to provide for separate
branches. Madison's interest in three branches was drawn more from
administrative necessities than from the writings of Montesquieu. The
Continental Congress had mismanaged its power under the Articles of
Confederation, he told Jefferson, and administrative duties under the
new government would be even more demanding. 7 At the conven-
tion, Madison reminded the delegates that experience with the states
had proved "a tendency in our governments to throw all power into
the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general lit-
tie more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent." s The separation
set up in the state constitutions had turned out to be a matter of mere
"parchment barriers" incapable of preventing legislatures from draw-
is See 3 ThE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAws 1893, 1897, 1902, 1904, 1905 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed.,
1909) [hereinafter Thorpe] (citing clauses from the Massachusetts Constitution con-
cerning the separation among the branches of state government).
16 4 Thorpe, supra note 15, at 2457 (quoting Article XXXVII of the New Hamp-
shire Bill of Rights).
17 See 2 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 328 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) ("The lim-
ited powers now vested in Congress are frequently mismanaged from the want of such
a distribution of them. What would be the case under an enlargement not only of the
powers, but the number of federal Representatives?").
182 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 35 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter Farrand].
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ing other branches into their orbit.'9
After the convention had adjourned, Madison confided to Jeffer-
son that the boundaries between the executive, legislative, and judicial
powers, "though in general so strongly marked in themselves, consist
in many instances of mere shades of difference.""0 He set out in The
Federalist Papers to contrast the overlapping of powers in the Constitu-
tion with the abstract and impracticable partitioning of powers advo-
cated by some of the critics.
The bulk of Madison's analysis of the separation doctrine appears
in Federalist No. 4Z He upheld the basic principle of the maxim that
tyranny results whenever three branches are concentrated in the same
hands, but he charged that the maxim had "been totally misconceived
and misapplied."2 1 Montesquieu, he said, could not possibly have
meant that the three powers of the British government were actually
kept separate. The executive magistrate formed a part of the legisla-
tive power by making treaties with foreign sovereigns, and he had a
share in the judicial power by appointing the members of the judici-
ary, as well as by having the power to remove them. Moreover, one
house of the legislature formed a constitutional council for the execu-
tive, had judicial power in the impeachment process, and was invested
with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges
could not vote in legislative actions, but were permitted to participate
in the deliberations.22
Madison then turned to the state constitutions for further guid-
ance, pointing out that in no instance were the departments of power
in the states kept absolutely separate and distinct. The intent of Mon-
tesquieu, Madison concluded, could be no more than this: "that
where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fun-
damental principles of a free constitution are subverted."
2 3
19 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961) (arguing that an "adequate defense" is necessary to protect less powerful
members of the government because the securities in the state constitutions are
"greatly overrated").
20 5 THE WRmNGS oFJAMEs MADISON 26 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
21 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336-37 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
2 See id. at 337.
23 Id. at 338.
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B. Checks and Balances
By the late 1780s, the concept of checks and balances had gained
dominance over the doctrine of separated powers, which one con-
temporary pamphleteer called a "hackneyed principle" and a "trite
maxim." Yet several delegates at the state ratifying conventions ex-
pressed shock at the degree to which the Constitution had mingled
the departments.
One delegate at the Virginia ratifying convention cried, "How is
the executive? Contrary to the opinion of all the best writers, blended
with the legislative. We have asked for bread, and they have given us a
stone." The draft Constitution was attacked at the North Carolina
ratifying convention for violating the maxim whereby the three
branches "ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other."26  Overlapping of departments also provoked criticism in
Pennsylvania. Opponents of the Constitution insisted that the Sen-
ate's judicial power in impeachment, as well as the executive's power
in making treaties, constituted an "undue and dangerous mixture of
the powers of government."27 A lengthy quotation from Montesquieu
was introduced to demonstrate the dependence of freedom and lib-
28erty on a separation of powers.
These three states recommended the addition of a separation
clause to the national bill of rights. Virginia offered draft language:
"legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of Government should be
seperate [sic] and distinct.' 0 North Carolina and Pennsylvania sub-
mitted their own versions of a separation clause.30 Congress compiled
a tentative list of restrictions on the national government, among
24 MJ.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISMAND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 153 (1967).
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS: ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 280 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila., Lippincott 1836) [hereinafter
Elliot].
26 4 id. at 116.
27 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 475 (John Bach
McMaster & Federal D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Pa., Inquirer 1888).
28 See id at 476-77 ("[T]here is no liberty, if the power ofjudging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers.... There would be an end of everything,
were the same man, or the same body of the nobles, or of the people, to exercise those
three powers .... ."(internal quotations omitted)).
2 EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 183
(1957) (quoting Amendments Proposed by Virginia Convention,June 27, 1788).
so See iU at 174-75, 199 (citing Pennsylvania's proposed amendments that "the leg-
islative, executive and judicial powers be kept separate;" citing North Carolina's pro-
posed amendments that "the legislative executive andjudiciary powers of government
should be separate and distinct").
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which was the following:
The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the de-
partments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the Legisla-
tive Department shall never exercise the powers vested in the Executive
or Judicial, nor the Executive exercise the powers vested in the Legisla-
tive orJudicial, nor the Judicial exercise the powers vested in the Legisla-
tive or Executive Departments.31
This language was among seventeen constitutional amendments
sent to the Senate, which struck it from the list. A substitute amend-
ment (to make the three departments "separate and distinct," and to
ensure that the legislative and executive departments would be re-
strained from oppression by "feeling and participating the public bur-
thens" through regular elections) was also voted down.2 The Senate
whittled the list of seventeen amendments down to twelve. Among
the deleted amendments was the separation clause.
The Framers did not object to a sharing or partial intermixture of
powers. They were not doctrinaire advocates of a pure separation of
powers between branches. Some overlapping was necessary to assure
a vigorous system of checks and balances. They knew that the "danger
of tyranny or injustice lurks in unchecked power, not in blended
power."0
3
II. THE WAR PREROGATIVE
The Framers were particularly intent on vesting the power of initi-
ating war in the Congress, as the people's representative. They were
well aware of the efforts of English kings to rely on extra-
parliamentary sources of revenue for their military expeditions and
other activities. Some of the extra-parliamentary revenue came from
foreign governments; some came from private citizens. Because of
these transgressions and encroachments of legislative prerogatives,
England lurched into a bloody civil war and Charles I lost both his
head and his office.
31 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435-36 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
32 1 SENATEJOURNAiS, 1788-1794, at 64, 73-74 (1820).
33KENNETH CULP DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw AND GOVERNMENT 36 (2d ed.
1975).
See PAUL EINZIG, THE CONTROL OF THE PURsE 57-62, 100-06 (1959) (discussing
the events leading to Charles I's execution and, more generally, the monarchy's insis-
tence on its divine right to levy taxation and the use of extra-parliamentary revenues,
often at the objection of the Parliament).
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A. Republican Principles
Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme Court from 1811 to
1845, wrote about the essential republican principle of vesting the de-
cision to go to war in the representative branch:
[T]he power of declaring war is not only the highest sovereign preroga-
tive; .. it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that
it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successive review of all the
councils of the nations. War, in its best estate, never fails to impose
upon the people the most burthensome taxes, and personal sufferings.
It is always injurious, and sometimes subversive of the great commercial,
manufacturing, and agricultural interests. Nay, it always involves the
prosperity, and not unfrequently the existence, of a nation. It is some-
times fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory,
which is ready to follow, wherever a successful commander will lead ....
It should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war; but not to
make peace.... The co-operation of all the branches of the legislative
power ought, u on principle, to be required in this the highest act of
legislation ....
The Framers deliberately divided government by making the
President the commander-in-chief and reserving to Congress the
power to finance military expeditions. The Framers rejected a gov-
ernment in which a single branch could both make war and fund it.
In Federalist No. 69, Alexander Hamilton argued that the American
President was far less threatening than the King of England. He ex-
plained that the power of the king "extends to the declaring of war and
to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies." 6 In contrast, the
Constitution placed those powers expressly with Congress. Jefferson
praised this transfer of the war power "from the executive to the Legis-
lative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."
37
Madison warned against placing the power of commander-in-chief in
the same hands as the power to go to war:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper
or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or con-
eluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in
free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSITrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
570, at 410-11-61 (Carolina Academic Press, 1987) (1833).
36 THE FEDERALST NO. 69, at 446 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OFTHOMASJEFFERSON 123 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895).
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purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.3
8
George Mason advised his colleagues at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion in 1787 that the "purse & the sword ought never to get into the
same hands <whether Legislative or Executive.>"3 9
B. Rejecting the British Models
The Framers were aware that British models placed the power to
initiate war with the monarch. John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil
Government spoke of three branches of government: legislative, execu-
tive, and "federative. 40 The last consisted of "the power of war and
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons
and communities without the commonwealth."4  The federative
power (or what we would call foreign policy today) was "always almost
united" with the executive.
42
Similarly, Sir William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century ju-
rist, vested foreign policy and the war power exclusively with the mon-
arch. In his Commentaries, he defined the King's prerogative broadly
to include the right to send and receive ambassadors, to make war or
peace, to make treaties, to issue letters of marque and reprisal
(authorizing private citizens to undertake military actions), and to
raise and regulate fleets and armies.4
Steeped in these models and theories, the Framers nonetheless
vested in Congress many of Locke's federative powers and Black-
stone's royal prerogatives. At the Philadelphia Convention, Charles
Pinckney said he supported "a vigorous Executive but was afraid the
Executive powers of <the existing> Congress might extend to peace &
war &c which would render the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst
kind, towit [sic] an elective one." James Wilson supported a single
James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. 1, GAzErFE OF THE UNITED STATES, Aug.
24, 1793, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 138, 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1906).
39 1 Farrand, supra note 18, at 139-40 (statement of George Mason in the Commit-
tee of the Whole onJune 6, 1787).
40 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOvERNMENT §§ 146-47, at 190 (London,
J.M. Dent & Sons 1962) (1690) (listing the three branches of commonwealth govern-
ment).
41 Id. § 146, at 191.
42 Id.
43 See 1 WILLIAM BLAcKsTONE, COMMENTARIEs *245-46, *249-52, *254-55, *257-58,
*261-62 (discussing each of the royal prerogatives).
44 1 Farrand, supra note 18, at 64-65 (statement of Charles Pinckney in the Com-
mittee of the Whole onJune 1, 1787).
0UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL WARS
executive but "did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Mon-
arch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of
these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of
war & peace &c. ' 4
Edmund Randolph worried about executive power, calling it "the
foetus of monarchy."46 The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention,
he said, had "no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. [sic]
as our prototype. 47 Wilson agreed that the British model "was inap-
plicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so
great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great con-
federated Republic would do for it."48 Drafts allocated the powers
over foreign affalirs and war that Locke and Blackstone had given to
the monarch either exclusively to Congress or shared between the
President and the Senate (as with the treaty and appointment pow-
ers) .'9
The one exception to this pattern of legislative control was the
discretion left to the President to repel sudden attacks. An early draft
empowered Congress to "make war."" Charles Pinckney objected that
legislative proceedings "were too slow" for the safety of the country in
an emergency since he expected Congress to meet but once a year.5
Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to insert "declare" for "make,"
leaving the President with "the power to repel sudden attacks. '52
Their motion carried.3 The duty to repel sudden attacks represented
an emergency measure that permits the President to take actions nec-
essary to resist sudden attacks against the United States. This discre-
tionary authority did not extend to taking the country into fhll-scale
war or to mounting an offensive attack against other nations. As John
Bassett Moore, a noted scholar of international law, remarked:
There can hardly be room for doubt that the Framers of the constitu-
Id. at 65-66 (statement of James Wilson in the Committee of the Whole on June
1, 1787).
" Id. at 66 (statement of Edmund Randolph in the Committee of the Whole on
June 1, 1787).
47 Id.
48 Id. (statement ofJames Wilson).
"' See2 Farrand, supra note 18, at 594 (§ 8), 599 (§ 2(a)).
so Id. at 143 (Draft for Committee of Detail, IV).
51 Id. at 318 (statement of Charles Pinckney in Convention on Aug. 17, 1787).
52 Id. (statement ofJames Madison and Elbridge Gerry in Convention on Aug. 17,
1787).
53 See id. at 319 (noting the passage of the motion to change "make" to "declare"
war by a vote of seven to two with one abstention).
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tion, when they vested in Congress the power to declare war, never imag-
ined that they were leaving it to the executive to use the military and na-
val forces of the United States all over the world for the purpose of actu-
ally coercing other nations, occupying their territory, and killing their
soldiers and citizens, all according to his own notions of the fitness of
things, as long as he refrained from calling his action war or persisted in
calling it peace.
Responses to the Madison-Gerry amendment reinforce the narrow
grant of authority to the President. Pierce Butler wanted to give the
President the power to make war, but other delegates strongly ob-
jected. As demonstrated by the debate below, these objecting dele-
gates supported "clogging rather than facilitating war."55 When it was
necessary to engage in war, that decision would be made by Congress,
not the President:
Mr [Pierce] Butler.... He was for vesting the [war] power in the Presi-
dent, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but
when the Nation will support it....
Mr Sharmen [Sherman] thought it stood very well. The Executive shd.
be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better than "de-
clare" the latter narrowing the power too much.
Mr Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Elseworth [Ellsworth]. there is a material difference between the
cases of making war, and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of
war, than into it...
Mr. Mason was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, because not
<safely> to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so con-
structed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitat-
ing war; but for facilitating peace .... 56
At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson expressed
the prevailing sentiment that the system of checks and balances
will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in
such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the
5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OFJOHN BASSETr MOORE 196 (1944).
55 2 Farrand, supra note 18, at 319 (statement of George Mason in opposition to
Pierce Butler made in Convention on Aug. 17, 1787).
56 Id. at 318-19 (statements of various named delegates in Proceedings in Commit-
tee of the Whole on Aug. 17, 1787).
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legislature at large.5 7
Similar comments were made by delegates to the North Carolina and
South Carolina ratifying conventions."
C. Associated War Powers
Through the granting of letters of marque and reprisal, sovereigns
were able to authorize private citizens to wage war on other countries.
By turning to citizens (or privateers), nations could augment their
armies and navies and respond more swiftly and with greater force to
emergencies and threats. Privately owned vessels were authorized to
prey on foreign vessels and take plunder, or "prizes." The phrase "let-
ters of marque and reprisal" came to refer to any use of force short of
a declared war.
Unlike Blackstone, who recognized that the king had the power to
issue letters of marque and reprisal, the Framers transferred that re-
sponsibility solely to Congress and associated it with the power to de-
clare war. The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o declare
war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water." 9 Any initiation of war, whether by dec-
laration or by marque and reprisal, was reserved to Congress. Thus,
both general and limited wars were left to the decision of the repre-
sentative branch. In 1793, Secretary of State ThomasJefferson related
marque and reprisal to the power to wage war. The making of a repri-
sal on a nation, he said, "is a very serious thing.... [W] hen reprisal
follows it is considered as an act of war, & never yet failed to produce
it in the case of a nation able to make war." 6 If it became necessary to
invoke this power, "Congress must be called on to take it; the right of
reprisal being expressly lodged with them by the constitution, & not
with the executive.,
6
1
During the Quasi War against France, from 1798 to 1800, Con-
gress authorized private citizens to provide vessels and other military
assistance. Alexander Hamilton, always protective of executive power,
recognized that the Constitution vested in Congress exclusive power
57 2 Elliot, supra note 25, at 528.
See 4 id. at 107, 287 (containing statements by James Iredell and Charles Pinck-
ney echoingWilson's reliance on checks and balances to guard against war).
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
60 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on "The Little Sarah" (May 16, 1793), in 6 TH
WRITINGS oFTHOMASJE1_ERSON, supra note 37, at 257, 259.
61 Id.
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over reprisals. In the midst of hostilities, the President could repel
force by force, but any actions beyond those measures "must fall un-
der the idea of reprisals & requires the sanction of that Department
which is to declare or make war."62 Congress also authorized letters of
marque during the War of 1812, but has not done so since that time.
Signatories to the Declaration of Paris, after the Crimean War in 1856,
renounced the use of letters of marque.
Seven clauses within Article I of the Constitution vest war powers
in Congress. Clause 11 empowers Congress to declare war, grant let-
ters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on
land and water. Clauses 12 and 13 empower Congress to raise and
support armies and provide and maintain a navy. Clauses 14, 15, and
16 authorize Congress to make rules for the government and regula-
tions of the land and naval forces, to call forth the militia, and to pro-
vide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the militia. At the
top of the list stands Clause 10, which empowers Congress "to define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations."6'
This cluster of powers broke with prevailing theories that placed
war powers, foreign affairs, and judgments on the law of nations with
the Executive. Blackstone, for example, regarded the law of nations
as part of the king's power. The law of nations consisted of "mutual
compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements" between various coun-
tries.6 It was the king's prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alli-
ances with foreign states.
At the Philadelphia Convention, Madison emphasized the impor-
tance of drafting a constitution that would "prevent those violations of
the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us
in the calamities of foreign wars."6 One of the early statutes passed by
Congress was legislation in 1790, setting forth punishments for certain
crimes against the United States.6 One provision established fines
and imprisonment for any person who attempted to prosecute or
bring legal action against an ambassador or other public minister
62 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798), in 21 THFE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 461-62 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974).
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
1 WILLIAM BLACysTONE, COMMENTARIES *43.
65 1 Farrand, supra note 18, at 816 (statement ofJames Madison in Committee of
the Whole on the Propositions of Mr. Patterson onJune 19, 1787).
SeeAct of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
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67from another country. Persons who took such actions were deemed
"violators of the laws of nations" who "infract the law of nations." 68 Ac-
tions against ambassadors and public ministers "tend[] to provoke the
resentment of the sovereign whom the ambassador represents, and to
bring upon the state the calamities of war."
The Neutrality Act of 179470 gave the Washington administration
the legal footing it needed to fine and imprison American citizens
whose actions might have embroiled the United States in the war be-
tween France and England. Almost two centuries later a districtjudge
noted that one of the major purposes of the Neutrality Act "was to
protect the constitutional power of Congress to declare war or author-
ize private reprisal against foreign states.'
D. Presidential Fame
The Framers gave Congress the power to initiate war because they
believed that presidents, in their search for fame and personal glory,
would have an appetite for war.n John Jay warned in Federalist No. 4
that
absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get
nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or pri-
vate compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or parti-
sans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of
the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice
or the voice and interests of his people.
Writing in 1793 under the name "Helvidius," Madison called war
the true nurse of executive aggrandizement ... In war, the honours and
emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive pa-
tronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that lau-
rels are to be gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to encircle.
67 See id. §§ 25-26.
68 Id. §§ 26, 28.
69 1JAmES KENT, COMMENTARIES ONAMERICAN LAW 170 (1826).
70 Act of May 22, 1794, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 369.
71 Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (regarding a man-
damus action brought by private plaintiffs to compel the Attorney General to investi-
gate whether the President and other federal executive officers violated the Neutrality
Act visg--vis Nicaragua).
72 See William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REv. 695, 695-701 (1997) (discussing the significance of vesting in Con-
gress the power to declare war and grant letters ofmarque and reprisal).
73 THEFEDERALIST NO. 4, at 101 (JohnJay) (Benjamin FletcherWright ed., 1961).
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The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human
breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame,
are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.74
Jay and Madison reflected Enlightenment libertarian principles
that looked with suspicion upon the monarchical appetite for initiat-
ing war to satisfy fame and personal glory.75 A republican government
relying on the consent of the people would embark on war with much
greater caution and circumspection. Madison insisted that war should
only be declared "by the authority of the people, whose toil and treas-
ure are to support its burdens."76
III. THE FRAMERS' MODEL IN PRACTICE
The Framers' model for constitutional government and demo-
cratic control worked well for about 160 years. Of course, the balance
of power between Congress and the President fluctuated from decade
to decade, depending on who served in the White House and what
kind of political conditions temporarily upset the distribution of
power. But Congress was fairly consistent in protecting its war power.
There was no wholesale delegation or abdication.
A. To Declare or Authorize
For all of the major military actions, Congress either declared war
or authorized it. A declaration of war was used for the War of 1812
against England, the War of 1846 against Mexico, the Spanish-
American War of 1898, World War I, and World War 11. 77 There were
two declarations for World War I (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and
six separate declarations for World War II (Japan, Germany, Italy,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania) .7  On other occasions, Congress
used the statutory process to authorize war, as with the "Quasi-War"
with France from 1798 to 1800 and the Barbary wars during theJeffer-
74 6THE WRTNGS OFJAMES MADISON 174 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
75 See JEFFREYA. SMITH, WARAND PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE
POWER 3, 5-6, 31 (1999) (explaining the Enlightenment aversion to warfare and pref-
erence for transparent and republican, versus monarchical, rule).
76 I& at 4.
See Act ofJune 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755; Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat.
9; Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364; Act of Apr. 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1; Act of
Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795.
78 SeeAct of Apr. 6, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1; Act of Dec. 17, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 429;
Act of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795; Act of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796; Act
of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 797; Act ofJune 5, 1942, ch. 323-25, 56 Stat. 307.
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son and Madison administrations.7 Similarly, Congress passed legisla-
tion authorizing military action in the Indian wars and the Whiskey
Rebellion."
During these early decades, presidents and executive officials uni-
formly acknowledged the need to come to Congress for authority to
support anything other than purely defensive operations. President
George Washington understood that existing statutory authority, giv-
ing him access to the militia to protect inhabitants of the frontiers,
permitted only defensive actions against hostile Indian forces. Any
step beyond defensive actions required authorization from Congress.8 '
Secretary of War Henry Knox told territorial governors that until
Congress decided otherwise, military operations were to be confined
to "defensive measures."82 The direction of offensive operations had
to await the decision of Congress, which was "solely... vested with the
powers of War."83 Knox said that Congress was "alone ... competent
to decide upon an offensive war. ...84
In proposing military action against France in the Quasi-War,
PresidentJohn Adams never argued that he could act unilaterally. He
knew that he was required to seek authority from Congress which had
enacted several dozen statutes increasing the size of the military and
79 See LOUIs FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 17-18, 26 (1995) (discussing stat-
utes enacted to authorize military operations against France and the Barbary powers).
8o See id. at 13-17 (discussing war power precedents from 1789 to 1800).
81 See Letter from George Washington to Governor William Moultrie (Aug. 28,
1793), in 33 THE WkrNGs OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 1745-1799, at 73 (John C. Fitz-
patrick ed., 1940) ("The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress;
therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they
shall have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure."). In one of
his messages on Indian affairs, Washington referred to military operations "offensive or
defensive," but the full text of his message is designed to avoid any initiative in warmak-
ing and to limit military actions to defensive measures. The President approved mili-
tary operations only in response to Indian attacks and pursuant to authorization by
Congress to "call forth the militia.., for the protection of the frontiers from the in-
cursions of the hostile Indians." See Instructions from the President of the United
States to the Governor of the Western Territory (Oct. 6, 1789), in 1 AMERicAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, CLASS 11, 96, 96-97 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke
eds., 1832).
82 Letter from Henry Knox to Governor Blount (Oct. 9, 1792), in 4 TMHE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNiED STATES 195 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1936)
[hereinafter TRRrORAL PAPERS].
Letter from Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to GovernorBlount (Nov. 26, 1792),
in TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 82, at 221.
Letter from Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to GovernorBlount (Mar. 23, 1795),
in TERRiTORIAL PAPERS, supra note 82, at 389.
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reinforcing the defense of ports and harbors.85 President Jefferson
was willing to take certain defensive actions against the Barbary pirates
but told Congress that he was "[u]nauthorized by the Constitution,
without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense.",
6
He believed that it was up to Congress to authorize "measures of of-
fence also.",7 In at least ten statutes, Congress authorized Presidents
Jefferson and Madison to take military actions against the Barbary
88
powers.
No doubtJefferson's message to Congress omitted many details of
what happened in the Mediterranean. s9 The essential legal point is
that he went to Congress to seek statutory authority. He did not claim
an independent and exclusive power to go to war. In 1805, when con-
flicts arose between the United States and Spain, Jefferson spoke
plainly about constitutional principles: "Congress alone is constitu-
tionally invested with the power of changing our condition from
peace to war. .... "go
Certainly presidential powers expanded in ways unexpected by the
Framers, particularly after presidents had a standing army and could
move troops into disputed areas to provoke war, as President Polk did
with Mexico. Polk was intent on gaining from Mexico the territories
known as Upper California and New Mexico. Through a series of dip-
lomatic and military initiatives, he was able to bring about a military
clash between American and Mexican troops and tell Congress that
"war exists."9' Although some legislators objected to Polk's tactics,
Congress declared war based on the recognition that "a state of war
exists."92 Polk never pretended that he could go to war against an-
85 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1798, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 547; Act of Apr. 27, 1798, ch. 31, 1
Stat. 552; Act of May 3, 1798, ch. 37, 1 Stat. 554; Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47-48, 1 Stat.
558; Act ofJuly 11, 1798, ch. 72, 1 Stat. 594; Act ofJuly 16, 1798, ch. 76, 1 Stat. 604 (es-
tablishing appropriations for armament; regiments of artillery; defense of ports and
harbors; the raising of a provisional army; protection of the coasts of the country; the
organizations of a Marine Corps; and augmentation of the Army).
86 Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 315 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau
of National Literature, Inc., NewYork 1897) [hereinafterRICHARDSON].
87 Id.
8 See FISHER, supra note 79, at 26 (noting congressional authorization of military
action during the presidencies ofJefferson and Madison).
89 See ABRAHAM D. SoFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 209-14 (1976) (detailing the events of the 1801 expedition to the Medi-
terranean).
90 15 ANNALs OF CONG. 19 (1805).
91 FISHER, supra note 79, at 32.
92 Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9; see also FISHER, supra note 79, at 29-34 (de-
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other country without asking Congress for authority.
Even during the crisis period of the Civil War, when President
Lincoln exercised extraordinary power while Congress was in recess,
he recognized that some of his actions (particularly suspending the
writ of habeas corpus) were probably in excess of his constitutional
authority. Lincoln operated under what John Locke called the "pre-
rogative": the executive power to act "according to discretion for the
public good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even
against it." s9 In the hands of an indiscriminate and unprincipled ex-
ecutive this formula can lead to autocracy, but Lincoln was not in-
clined to be a dictator.
When Congress returned he explained that his actions, "whether
strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a
popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that
Congress would readily ratify them."94 He conceded that he had acted
not only under his Article II powers but under the Article I powers of
Congress as well. He believed that suspending the writ of habeas cor-
pus was not "beyond the constitutional competency of Congress." 5
Congress debated at length his request for retroactive authority. Leg-
islators ended up supporting the President, but argued for an assump-
tion that his actions were illegal.96 Legislation was passed approving,
legalizing, and making valid "all the acts, proclamations, and orders of
the President... as if they had been issued and done under the pre-
vious express authority and direction of the Congress of the United
States.""
B. Unauthorized PresidentialActions
From 1789 to 1950, presidents used military force unilaterally
numerous times without seeking or obtaining the authority of Con-
gress. Those ventures, however, were relatively modest in scope and
limited in duration. As Edward S. Corwin noted, these presidential
initiatives consisted largely of "fights with pirates, landings of small na-
tailing Polk's actions in the disputed territory and the congressional reaction).
93 JOHN LOCKE, THE SEcOND TREATISE ON CIvM GOVERNMENT 89 (Prometheus
Books 1986) (1690).
94 Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7 RIcHARDsON, su-
pra note 86, at 3221, 3225.
. Id"
96 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 393 (1861) (reporting Senator Howe's
statement that he would vote to support the President's actions "upon the assumption
that the different acts of the Administration... were illegal").
97 Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, 12 Stat. 326.
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val contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of
small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the
Mexican border, and the like."98 They are, however, in no sense a
precedent for the single-handed presidential actions taken after
World War II, such as Truman's war against North Korea, Bush's
claim in 1990 that he could go to war against Iraq without congres-
sional authority, and Clinton's repeated use of military force in Bos-
nia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Haiti, Sudan, and Afghanistan without ever seek-
ing authority from Congress.
Lists have been compiled to show that presidents have resorted to
force against other countries hundreds of times with Congress neither
declaring war nor authorizing military action.9 Many of these opera-
tions were minor, such as American forces building a fort on the Mar-
quesas Islands in 1813-1814 to protect three prize ships captured from
the British; brief landings in Cuba in 1823 in pursuit of pirates; an
1840 landing on the Fiji Islands to punish natives for attacking Ameri-
can exploring and surveying parties; a display of naval force in Japan
in 1853-1854; another display of naval force off of Turkey in 1858-
1859; the landing of a naval party in Buenos Aires in 1890 to protect
the U.S. consulate and legation; the landing of U.S. forces in Beirut in
1903 to protect the American consulate; and the sending of troops to
Panama in 1912 to supervise elections outside the Canal Zone.00 Ad-
ditionally, many of those actions were initiated by military command-
ers, not by presidents."'
Some of the military interventions were much more significant
but would hardly serve as a model for U.S. policy today. For example,
in 1854 an American ship was ordered to the Nicaraguan port of
Greytown (now San Juan del Norte) to compel local authorities to
make appropriate amends for an affront to an American diplomat.
When U.S. officials deemed the offered apology inadequate, the ship
bombarded the town and forces were sent ashore to destroy by fire
98 Edward S. Corwin, The President's Power, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1951, at 15, 16.
9 See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT No. RL
30172, INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-1999 (1999)
(reviewing "hundreds of instances in which the United States has utilized military
forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citi-
zens or promote U.S. interests").
100 See id. at 2-12 (providing a brief description of various U.S. military actions
abroad).
101 See id. at 1-12 ("In some instances a military officer acted without authorization
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whatever remained.1 A number of other military operations, includ-
ing the occupation and bombardment of Veracruz in 1914; the inter-
vention and occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934; an eight-year oc-
cupation of the Dominican Republic, beginning in 1916; and
repeated interventions in Nicaragua from 1909 to 1933 would be con-
demned, both under the non-intervention policy of the Organization
of American States ("OAS") and the U.N. Charter, which proscribes
"the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state.
10 4
IV. SCHOLARLYANALYSIS
Questions about the Framers' intent invariably cause scholars to
scatter and divide. Not so with the war power. There is remarkable
agreement among war power experts that the Framers broke with
available monarchical precedents and vested in Congress the sole
power to initiate hostilities against other nations.
A. Consensus Among Scholars
The majority of scholars agree on the interpretation of the war
power. Taylor Reveley writes that if you could ask a man in the state
of nature to read the war power provisions in the Constitution and
compare them to war power practices after 1789, "he would marvel at
how much Presidents have spun out of so little. On its face, the text
tilts decisively toward Congress."0 5 Charles Lofgren agrees with Rev-
eley finding that the grants of power to Congress to declare war and to
issue letters of marque and reprisal "likely convinced contemporaries
even further that the new Congress would have nearly complete
authority over the commencement of war." 6 He concludes that
events in the years following ratification of the Constitution rein-
102 See FISHER, supra note 79, at 35-37 (recounting the bombardment of Greytown
and its effects).
103 Article 20 of the OAS provides that the territory of a nation is inviolable and it
'may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of any other meas-
ures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever."
CHARTER FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (as revised) art. 20.
104 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.105 W. TAYLOR REvELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO
HOLDS THEARROWS AND OLIvE BRANCH? 29 (1981).
106 CHARLES A. LOFGREN, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing in "GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE": CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS
ON WAR, FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 3,36 (1986).
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forced the view that Americans "originally understood Congress to
have at least a coordinate, and probably the dominant, role in initiat-
ing all but the most obviously defensive wars, whether declared or
not.
0 7
John Hart Ely notes that when academics try to divine the "origi-
nal understanding" of the Constitution, the results can be "obscure to
the point of inscrutability."108 When the focus turns on the war power,
however, the issue is not that complicated. All wars, big or small, de-
clared or undeclared, "had to be legislatively authorized.'1 9 David
Gray Adler writes that the Constitution "makes Congress the sole and
exclusive repository of the ultimate foreign relations power-the
authority to initiate war.""0
Michael Glennon says that it "is clear that the Constitution's tex-
tual grants of war-making power to the President are paltry in com-
parison with, and are subordinate to, its grants to Congress.""' He
further notes that there "is no evidence that the Framers intended to
confer upon the President any independent authority to commit the
armed forces to combat, except in order to repel 'sudden attacks.'
Harold Koh writes in a similar fashion noting that "[t]he first three
articles of the Constitution expressly divided foreign affairs powers
among the three branches of government, with Congress, not the
president, being granted the dominant role.""' The Framers "point-
edly denied" the President other grants of power, such as the power to
declare war, "thereby rejecting the English model of a king who pos-
sessed both the power to declare war and the authority to command
troops.""
4
B. John Yoo's Work
The major exception to these studies is an article written in 1996
by John Yoo, who argues that the Framers designed a system to "en-
107 Id. at 38.
108 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILrl: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AYrERMATH 3 (1993).
109 Id.
11 David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERicAN FOREIGN Poucy 19, 19 (David Gray Adler & Larry N.
George eds., 1996).
if MICHAELJ. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 72 (1990).
112 Id. at 81.
n1 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURTIY CONsTrTUTION: SHARING
POWERAFMTRTHE IRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR 75 (1990).
"4 Id. at 76.
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courage presidential initiative in war.""5 Yoo argues that not only
would the executive "play the leading role in initiating.., war" but
also that "the Constitution gives the President the initiative in war.""
6
Yet at times Yoo backs away from that position by saying the Declare
War Clause "made clear that the President could not unilaterally take
the nation into a total war."1 1 7 Also, he claims that Madison "quite
presciently wanted to prevent the President from using his war power
to enhance his overall power and importance vis-a-vis Congress and
the People."" 8
1. Defensive-Offensive
Yoo does not carefully distinguish between the exercise of the
President's defensive powers and the initiation of offensive actions
against another country.19 Taking the United States from a state of
peace to a state of war was a prerogative assigned exclusively to Con-
gress. He makes no mention of the understanding by President Wash-
ington, Secretary of War Knox, President Jefferson, and other execu-
tive leaders of that time that the President's powers over war were
restricted to defensive operations.
In The Prize Cases of 1863,12 the Supreme Court spoke clearly
about the President's authority to conduct defensive but not offensive
actions. Justice Grier said that President Lincoln had authority to take
military action in a civil war "without waiting for Congress to baptize it
with a name" 21 but carefully stated that the President "has no power to
initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic
State."'2 The executive branch took exactly the same position in that
case. During oral argument Richard Henry DanaJr., representing the
United States, said that Lincoln's action in responding to the Civil
War had nothing to do with "the right to initiate a war, as a voluntary act
15 John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understand-
ingofWarPowers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996).
16 Id. at 268, 295.
11 Id. at 264.
118 Id at 266.
19 See id at 174 (explaining instead that "[t]he Constitution establishe[d] a war-
making process that can vary with the circumstances and with the relative political
power of the President and Congress").
120 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (noting that "[i]f a war be made by invasion
of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by
force").121 Id. at 668.
122 Md at 669.
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of sovereignty. That is vested only in Congress."' 23
Yoo never mentions Chief Justice Marshall's remark in Talbot v.
Seeman that " [t]he whole powers of war" are vested in Congress.2 4 Nor
does Yoo discuss United States v. Smith, an 1806 circuit court case,
which asked and answered its own question: "Does [the President]
possess the power of making war? That power is exclusively vested in
congress .... [It is] the exclusive province of congress to change a
state of peace into a state or war. ' 2' Harold Koh makes this comment
about Smith: "the crucial point is that even during America's infancy,
the time of its greatest national insecurity, foreign affairs were not
treated as exempt from the ordinary constitutional system of checks
and balances.',
26
2. Declare War Clause
Yoo concludes that the Declare War Clause is of legislative-
judicial, not legislative-executive, interest. Thus, the Framers "under-
stood the Declare War Clause as a judicial power vested in Congress,
just as the Constitution gave the Senate judicial authority in the trial
of impeachments. In these areas, the Constitution places Congress in
the position of the court of last resort." 27 The Declare War Clause,
Yoo argues,
does not add to Congress' store of war powers at the expense of the
President. Rather, the Clause gives Congress ajudicial role in declaring
that a state of war exists between the United States and another nation,
which bears significant legal ramifications concerning the rights and du-
ties of American citizens. Congress' power to declare war also has the
additional effect of ousting the courts from war powers disputes ....128
By reading the Declare War Clause as not affecting presidential
power, Yoo ignores concerns raised at the Philadelphia Convention
and the ratification conventions. The issue, as James Wilson defined
it, was about keeping the power of war out of the hands of "a single
man."129 Yoo does not address Wilson's comment in the text of his ar-
ticle. Instead, it is relegated to a long footnote,"' and Wilson becomes
123 Id. at 660.
124 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
12 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
126 KOH, supra note 113, at 83.
127 Yoo, supra note 115, at 288.
128 Id. at 295.
12 Id. at 286 n.547.
ISO See id. (discussing Wilson's doubts about adopting a system in which war powers
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"exceptional rather than typical."'31 Yoo dilutes Wilson's views by say-
ing they "appear[] to refer to the formal aspects of a declaration of
war, rather than to the authorizing process for the commencement of
hostilities.",32 Nothing in Wilson's address at the Pennsylvania ratify-
ing convention would suggest such a narrow construction. Wilson
wanted a political system that "will not hurry us into war.133 He advo-
cated legislative deliberation, not quick executive action. His remarks
support full legislative debate, whether that leads to a formal declara-
tion or authorization. Although Yoo attempts to confine Wilson's
comments about "a single man" to total war, he concedes that later in
his life Wilson continued to believe that Congress "should play the
paramount role in war. "1
Yoo attempts to weaken the meaning of the Declare War Clause by
saying it was intended to clarify that "the declaration of war was a
power of the national government, not the state governments. "13 1 If
that were the purpose, why not (following British precedents) give the
power to declare war to the President? That would solve the federal-
ism issue.
Relying on Madison's Federalist No. 41, Yoo states that "the [De-
clare War] Clause was designed to allow the national government to
provide '[s] ecurity against foreign danger.",3 6 Responding to foreign
threats and attacks is part of the President's duty to act in a defensive
manner and is unrelated to initiating war or taking the country from a
state of peace to a state of war. Similarly, Yoo states that "a declaration
of war was unnecessary when a nation was under attack[, providing]
further evidence that declarations of war were legally formal, or even
ceremonial, in purpose," and that understanding was "[c]onsistent
with the theory of international law that a declaration of war was un-
necessary for a nation under attack."17 Yoo's discussion relates to de-
fensive, not offensive, actions. Yoo refers to Hamilton's statement in
Federalist No. 23 about the need for the national government to be able
to "respond to unpredictable events and foreign dangers."34 Notice
that Hamilton is talking about the necessity of the national government's,
are vested in the executive, rather than the legislature).
131 Id.
1S Id.
" Id.
1 Id.132
135 Id. at 242.
136 Id. at 243.
137 I& at 247.
S Id. at 270.
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not merely the President's, ability to respond to foreign attacks rather
than initiate war. Hamilton's comments, therefore, also relate to de-
fensive operations. Yoo quotes from Madison's Federalist No. 41: "It is
in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation." 9 Once again, the discussion relates to defensive, as
opposed to offensive, activity.
3. Judicial Review
Yoo argues that the Declare War Clause had the effect of "ousting
the courts from war powers disputes.' '4 "Having placed war powers in
the arena of politics, the Framers would have viewed inter-branch dis-
putes in the area as unsuitable for judicial resolution."14 1 The courts,
however, did not shy away from war powers disputes. Decisions by the
Supreme Court in 1800 and 1801, and by the circuit court in 1806,
demonstrate a willingness to decide war power issues,'4 2 even though
they were not "inter-branch disputes" because they did not involve di-
rect clashes between Congress and the President.
In Little v. Barreme, however, ChiefJustice Marshall, writing for the
Court, concluded that a congressional statute superceded a presiden-
tial proclamation.'4 In a footnote, Yoo states that the Court in Little
"did not really ... pass judgment on the exercise of war powers, and
thus did not present a political question."'4 In fact, the Court did pass
judgment on the war power by holding that a statute trumps a presi-
dential proclamation. Yoo further writes: "Little never reached ques-
tions concerning the justiciability of inter-branch war powers disputes,
or the President's inherent authority to order captures going beyond
139 Id. at 271.
140 Id. at 295.
141 Id. at 288.
142 See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 1 (1801) (allowing salvage to a
United States ship of war that captured a neutral owned ship from the French); Bas v.
Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (holding that the act of Congress of March 2,
1799, applied to an American ship captured by a French privateer because France and
the United States were involved in a public war and, therefore, considered "enemies"
for the purpose of the statute); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229-30 (C.C.D.
N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (noting that the President does not have the "authority to set
on foot a military expedition against a nation with which the United States are [sic] at
peace").
143 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding that Congress's act of February 9,
1799, did not authorize the seizure of ships sailing from French ports, and that the
President's order to seize such ships can not exonerate an American commander
where he seized such a ship).
144 Yoo, supra note 115, at 295 n.584.
UNCHECKED PRESLDENTIAL WARS
Congress's commands." 145 The Court did address an inter-branch dis-
pute, however, and it dismissed any notion that President Adams had
some kind of inherent authority that was superior to a congressional
statute. At best, Chief Justice Marshall concedes that Adams might
have taken certain measures in the absence of a congressional statute."'
Yoo writes that "[n]o provision [of the Constitution] explicitly
authorizes the federal courts to intervene directly in war powers ques-
tions."47 Of course, the same could be said about the Commerce
Clause, the Taxing Power, and other constitutional provisions. The
Court's jurisdiction does not depend on subject matter, except re-
garding disputes concerning treaties, ambassadors, "other public Min-
isters and Consuls," admiralty, and disputes between states, states and
citizens, and states and foreign states. 48 The Court's jurisdiction
reaches beyond these subject areas to embrace all "cases" and "con-
troversies."
4. Declaration and Authorization
Yoo focuses almost exclusively on Congress's power to declare war,
rarely recognizing the power of Congress to authorize war. He begins
by pointing out that "Congress has issued a declaration of war only
five times in its history" and that the post-1945 era includes "a litany of
undeclared wars."' 49 Counting the multiple declarations in the two
world wars, there have actually been eleven declarations of war. Later
Yoo recognizes that "[f] or much of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Congress assented to presidential uses of force abroad,"15 °
but does not explain that Congress's "assent" came in the form of
authorizing statutes.
For example, Yoo states that "[e ] ven though no declaration of war
had issued against the Indians, George Washington exclaimed, 'But,
we are involved in actual war!'' 5 Washington was operating on statu-
tory authority, not inherent executive power. In 1789, 1790, and
1791, Congress passed legislation "for the purpose of protecting the
14 1&
146 see id
147 Id. at 176.
148 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (describing the breadth of the judicial power).
149 Yoo, supra note 115, at 172.
ISO I& at 177.
1 Id. at 290-91 (quoting RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALiSTS
AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERIcA, 1783-1802, at 107
(1975)).
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inhabitants of the frontiers of the United States from the hostile in-
cursions of the Indians."15' In 1793, Washington said that any offen-
sive operation against the Creek Nation must await congressional ac-
tion: "The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with
Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be
undertaken until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject,
and authorized such a measure."15 3
Yoo does refer to the Quasi-War against France and the "full-scale
battles" that occurred despite the lack of a declaration of war.'5
There were, however, about two dozen statutes authorizing Adams to
act as he did during that war. 5 Yoo argues that "Congress' failure to
declare war against France also demonstrates the limited nature of the
conflict.' ' 56 There was no "failure" on the part of Congress. It chose
to authorize, not declare, war, and it was the nature of this authoriza-
tion (supporting naval but not land forces) that kept the war limited.
Yoo states that the Framers "were not excessively worried by the
prospect of unilateral executive action. The President was seen as the
protector and representative of the People." 5 7 This statement ignores
what Jay, in Federalist No. 4, and Madison, as "Helvidius," said about
executives being prone to war; they initiate war not because it is in the
interest of the people but because war furthers their ambitions and
satisfies their thirst for fame and glory. None of these concerns ap-
pear in Yoo's article.
5. British Precedents
According to Yoo, "[t] he Constitution's provisions did not break
152 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 27, § 5, 1 Stat. 95; see also Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, §
16, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (authorizing the President to call out the militia for "the purpose
of aiding the troops now in service, or to be raised by this act, in protecting the inhabi-
tants of the frontiers of the United States"); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 222
(raising and adding another regiment to the United States military and providing fur-
therprotection of the frontiers).
Letter from George Washington to Governor William Moultrie, supra note 81,
at 73.
15 Yoo, supra note 115, at 291 (noting the occurrence of raids on merchant com-
merce, full scale battles, and the creation of a regular army during the Quasi-War be-
tween the United States and France).
155 See FISHER, supra note 79, at 17-18 (discussing several ways in which Congress
supported military action by the President, and noting that "Congress had acted to
authorize war").
156 Yoo, supra note 115, at 292.
157 Id. at 174.
15 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
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with the tradition of their English, state, and revolutionary predeces-
sors, but instead followed in their footsteps." 15 9 He devotes twenty-two
pages to the British legacy, including descriptions of the goals of
Locke, Blackstone, Montesquieu, and others advocating for the inde-
pendent and exclusive executive power over war and peace, the treaty
power, declaration of war, raising armies, issuing letters of marque
and reprisal, and other powers. He concludes that "the war powers
provisions of the Constitution are best understood as an adoption,
rather than a rejection, of the traditional British approach to war
powers."' 60 The statements by James Wilson and others at the Phila-
delphia Convention overwhelmingly refute Yoo's position. 6'
It is impossible to compare what Locke and Blackstone advocated
to what the Framers provided in Articles I and II without concluding
that the Framers repudiated the British model on war powers. It is
not even necessary to examine the Framers' intent. It is enough to
look at the text of the Constitution. Yoo states correctly that the Eng-
lish system "gave the executive leadership in the initiation and con-
duct of war, while the legislature was relegated primarily to funding
the wars and impeaching ministers." 162 But he utterly fails to equate
that model with what the Framers conceived. However much he
strains to make this work, the express language of the Constitution
stands in his way. If the Framers had adopted "the traditional British
approach to war powers," they would have written Article II to give the
President the power to declare war, to issue letters of marque and re-
prisal, and to raise armies, along with all the other powers that were
vested expressly in Congress.
Hamilton, more enamoured with the British model than the other
Framers, never advocated the British model for war powers or foreign
affairs. In Federalist No. 75, he wrote of the treaty power:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests
of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its inter-
course with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate cre-
ated and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.
163
159 Yoo, supra note 115, at 197.
160 Id. at 242.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
162 Yoo, supra note 115, at 198.
16 THE FEDERAiIST No. 75, at 477 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).
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6. Funding As Congress's Primary Power
For Yoo, whenever the President initiates war, "Congress could
express its opposition... only by exercising its powers over funding
and impeachment."'4 He draws an analogy to European precedents:
"legislatures of the eighteenth century controlled executive actions
leading to war by using their appropriations power. " '6 Noting that
scholars argue that the power of the purse is a "permissible means" for
Congress to participate in foreign affairs, Yoo "suggests that the
spending power may be the only means for legislative control over
war."1 In establishing a framework for the exercise of war power, Yoo
says that the Framers "intended to adopt the traditional system they
knew-executive initiative in war combined with a legislative role via
the spending power."
67
First, it cannot be the case that the President may exercise powers
that are not granted by the Constitution until Congress successfully
exercises its spending power to block him. If that were the case, after
President Clinton in 1994 had failed to convince Congress of the mer-
its of his health plan, he could simply have issued it as a proclamation
and waited to see if Congress passed legislation to deny him the funds
to implement the proclamation. Such a procedure would reverse the
constitutional order. The burden is on the President to come
through the front door and seek authorization from Congress for his
legislative proposals. The same principle applies to taking the nation
from a state of peace to a state of war. The framers expected the
President to submit his proposal to Congress and await authorization
from the legislative body.
Second, if Congress were forced to use the power of the purse to
stop presidential war initiatives, it would have to place restrictive lan-
guage in a bill presented to the President. Instead of the President
having to muster a majority in each House to support his policy, each
House would need a majority to stop the President. Moreover, when
the bill reached the President, he could exercise his veto. Congress
would then need an extraordinary majority-a two-thirds majority-in
each House to override the veto and enforce the spending limitation.
As long as the President could maintain a margin of one-third plus
one in a single chamber, his veto would be upheld, even if the other
164 Yoo, supra note 115, at 174.
165 Id. at 197.
16 Id. at 197 n.158.
167 Id. at241.
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chamber voted unanimously for the override.
This kind of impasse occurred during the Vietnam War. In 1973,
Congress assembled a majority in each House to vote for a funds cut-
off to stop the war. When President Nixon vetoed the measure, Con-
gress was unable to find the two-thirds margin in each House for an
override.'63 The two branches eventually reached a compromise, al-
lowing President Nixon to bomb Cambodia for another forty-five
days.1
69
The political settlement affected litigation that had been progress-
ing in the federal courts. In one lawsuit, a federal judge held that
Congress had not authorized the bombing of Cambodia. 170 Thejudge
said that the inability of Congress to override the veto and its subse-
quent adoption of the compromise language could not be taken as an
affirmative grant of authority.
It cannot be the rule that the President needs a vote of only one-third
plus one of either House in order to conduct a war, but this would be
the consequence of holding that Congress must override a Presidential
veto in order to terminate hostilities which it has not authorized.1
7 '
Because the two branches had agreed to compromise language, appel-
late courts granted a stay on the district courts decision.17
Third, Yoo argues that when President Bush mounted an offensive
war against Iraq, all Congress had to do to check him through the ap-
propriations power "was nothing."'7 This statement ignores the
amount of money available to the President in the money pipeline:
billions of dollars in previously appropriated funds that had yet to be
obligated or expended. The President may also exercise statutory
authority to transfer funds from one appropriations account to an-
other and invoke emergency authority, such as the Feed and Forage
163 See 1973 PUBLC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 621-22 (vetoing the bill and noting
that the veto was not overriden by the House); 119 CONG. REC. 21778 (1973) (sustaining
the veto).
169 See Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973, § 307, 87 Stat. 129 (prohib-
iting use of any appropriated funds "to support directly or indirectly combat activities in
or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam" after the expiration of 45
days).
170 SeeHoltzmanv. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553,565 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
171 Id.
'72 SeeHoltzmanv. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1310, 1316, 1321 (1973) (grantingan
application for a stay of the district court order);Holtzman v. Schlesinger,484 F.2d 1307,
1313-14 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding the argument that the Presidentonly required a vote of
"one-thirdplus one" unpersuasive in light of the compromise language).
Yoo, supra note 115, at 297.
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Act, to incur obligations in advance of an appropriations.174 A war ini-
tiated by the President can proceed for quite a period of time, inde-
pendent of fresh appropriations granted by Congress.
Lastly, Yoo claims that when President Clinton decided to send
20,000 American troops to Bosnia in 1995, he "already had received
funding for the Bosnia operation in the 1996 Defense Department
appropriations. " 175 In fact, Congress had appropriated nothing for
Bosnia. Clinton's military commitment was financed not by funds
specifically appropriated by Congress but rather by siphoning several
billion dollars from other appropriations accounts without congres-
sional deliberation or support. Approval for this prestigination came
from a few legislative leaders, not from Congress nor statutory lan-
176guage.
VI. WAR PowERs DocTRiNE IN Kosovo
On March 11, 1999, with President Clinton close to unleashing air
strikes against Serbia, the House voted on a resolution to support U.S.
armed forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation. The resolu-
tion purporting to "authorize" Clinton to deploy U.S. forces to im-
plement a peace agreement passed, 219 to 191.177 However, legislators
were voting on a concurrent resolution (House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 42); Congress cannot authorize anything in a concurrent resolu-
tion because it is not legally binding. Authorization requires a bill or
joint resolution, both of which are presented to the President for his
signature or veto. A concurrent resolution passes both chambers but
is not presented. A second point: by supporting a NATO peacekeep-
ing operation, members of the House clearly anticipated a peace
agreement between Serbs and Kosovars. The House was not support-
ing military action. The Kosovars eventually accepted the plan, but
the Serbs did not. Therefore, the House vote cannot be taken as sup-
port for the bombing operation that would begin within two weeks.
174 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 110-18, 238-47 (1975) (discuss-
ing Nixon's use of transfer authority to fund the war in Cambodia, and the open-ended
authority of the Department of Defense to commit funds under the Feed and Forage
Act).
175 Yoo, supra note 115, at 298.
176 SeeLouis Fisher, TheBosnia Commitmen4 LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 22 (noting
that some legislators deferred to Clinton's decision to send troops but asserting that
there was not adequate process because there was no action or authorization by the en-
tire Congress).
177 145 CONG. REc. H1249-50 (dailyed. Mar. 11, 1999).
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By the time the Senate voted on March 23, 1999, negotiations had
collapsed and air strikes were imminent. The Senate voted fifty-eight
to forty-one in support of military air operations and missile strikes
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro).'78 Like the House, the Senate made the mistake of using the
word "authorize" in a concurrent resolution (Senate Concurrent
Resolution 21'7). The war againstYugoslavia began on March 24.
Following these votes in the House and the Senate and the out-
break of war, CongressmanJim Leach (R-Ohio) wrote an op-ed piece
that said, correctly, that the War Powers Resolution "stands as a decla-
ration that war is too profound a business to be left to a single indi-
vidual.""8 " That value was indeed uppermost in the minds of the
Framers. And yet Leach claimed that Clinton was "on solid legal
ground for the military steps he has taken.""" Neither the House nor
the Senate vote provided legal support for Clinton. He operated
against the Constitution and without any statutory support. There was
no legal or constitutional ground for his actions.
On April 28, 1999, after the first month of bombing, the House
took a series of votes on the war in Yugoslavia. It voted 249 to 180 to
prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the deployment of U.S.
ground forces unless first authorized by Congress. A motion to direct
the removal of U.S. armed forces fromYugoslavia failed, 290 to 139. A
resolution to declare a state of war between the United States and
Yugoslavia fell, 427 to two. A fourth vote, to authorize air operations
and missile strikes, lost on a tie vote, 213 to 213.'
2
Newspaper editorials and commentators derided the House for
these multiple and supposedly conflicting votes, but the House ar-
ticulated some basic values. It insisted that Congress authorize the in-
troduction of ground troops and it refused to grant authority for the
air strikes. Lawmakers pointed to the irony of President Clinton seek-
ing the approval of eighteen NATO nations but not the approval of
Congress. Congressman Ernest Istook (R-Okla.) remarked: "Presi-
dent Clinton asked many nations to agree to attack Yugoslavia, but he
178 See145 CONG. REC. S3118 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1999).
17 Id. at S3110.
'80 James A. Leach, A War Vote, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1999, atA31.
181 Id.
182 See 145 CONG. REc. H2376-452 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
183 See, e.g., Julie Malone, Mixed Signals for the House Get Tangled Interpretations,
TInES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 30, 1999, at A12; Editorial, No-confidence Vote for a
Waffling House, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 30, 1999, at 26A, Editorial, War Waffling in House,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at B6.
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failed to get permission from one crucial country, America."
8 4
Although President Clinton claimed to be operating under the
"authority" of NATO decisions, the NATO treaty of 1949 did not
transfer the war power from Congress to a regional military alliance.
There is nothing in the text or legislative history of NATO, or any
other mutual defense pact, to support such a transfer.18 Mutual secu-
rity treaties do not-they cannot-alter the constitutional allocation
of the war power. It would be impermissible for the Senate and the
President to use the treaty process to deny the House of Representa-
tives its Article I powers in determining whether the nation should
commit itself to war."" Senator Walter George said this about SEATO:
"The treaty does not call for automatic action; it calls for consultation.
If any course of action shall be agreed upon or decided upon, then
that course of action must have the approval of Congress, because the
constitutional process is provided for." 87
This same reasoning applies to resolutions passed by the U.N. Se-
curity Council to "authorize" military action. Although President
Truman relied on those resolutions in taking the nation to war against
North Korea, and President Bush threatened to take military action
188against Iraq on the basis of a Security Council resolution,' U.N. reso-
lutions are not a source of authority and do not supplant the need for
obtaining authority from the only branch capable of giving it: Con-
gress. Just as Congress did not transfer its war power to mutual secu-
rity pacts, neither did it transfer its war power to the U.N. 89 In 1994,
after the Security Council passed a resolution "inviting" all states to
use "all necessary means" to remove military leaders from Haiti, the
Senate responded with a nonbinding resolution stating that the Secu-
rity Council resolution "does not constitute authorization for the de-
ployment of United States Armed Forces in Haiti under the Constitu-
tion of the United States or pursuant to the War Powers Resolution
18 145 CONG. REc. H2419 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
18 See FISHER, supra note 79, at 92-97 (arguing that mutual security treaties "do not
empower the President to use armed force abroad without congressionalconsent).
,86 SeeMichaelJ. Glennon, UnitedStates MutualSecurity Treaties: The Commitment Myth,
24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 509 (1986) (arguing that without legislative approval presi-
dential action predicated upon a mutual securitytreaty is constitutionally unauthorized).
187 101 CONG. REC. 1051 (1955).
198 See FISHER, supra note 79, at 84-86, 148-51 (noting the reliance by both Truman
and Bush on U.N. resolutions as authorization for their actions).
189 See i&L at 72-84 (arguing that the U.N. Charter and the U.N. Participation Act of
1945 did not alter the constitutional frameworkby allowing the President to take military
action without obtaining congressional approval).
UNCHECKED PRESIDENTAL WARS
(Public Law 93-148)." 190 The Senate language passed by a vote of 100
191
to zero.
CONCLUSIONS
For more than a century and a half, from 1789 to 1945, Congress
and the President followed the general constitutional principle that
the initiation of war against foreign nations lay with the representative
branch, Congress. That understanding was recognized in several
court decisions, some of them authored by Chief Justice Marshall. A
number of presidential military initiatives were taken during this pe-
riod, but those actions were relatively modest in scope and limited in
time. During this period, no president claimed the right to take the
country to war without first seeking the authority of Congress. Presi-
dent Polk's initiatives led to hostilities between the United States and
Mexico, but Polk came to Congress for authority to declare war. In
the one major military conflict where the president acted first-Lin-
coln in the Civil War-the dispute was domestic, not foreign. Even
here Lincoln acknowledged that he lacked full constitutional author-
ity for what he had done, and asked Congress to enact legislation to
provide the necessary legitimacy.
In warning about the possibility of Congress's "pushing the coun-
try into war too hastily," Yoo invokes this language from Federalist No.
70: "'In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil
than a benefit. "1 92 Supposedly the value here is avoiding hasty, and
possibly misguided, action. Yet on the same page Yoo turns the prin-
ciple on its head by describing the President's ability to "act quickly,"
"swiftly and with decisiveness."1 9 3 The Framers did not want cautious,
deliberative action by Congress and unilateral, precipitate action by
the President, other than when repelling sudden attacks. The delib-
erative model applies to both branches, acting jointly.
For the initiation of war, the Framers wanted both branches to act
with deliberation and full debate through the regular legislative proc-
ess to determine whether hostilities were in the national interest.
When James Wilson said it would not be in the power "of a single
man" to involve the nation in war, he believed that by relying on the
190 140 CONG. REC. 19324 (1994).
191 See i&.
19.2 Yoo, supra note 115, at 304 (quoting TM FEDERALIST No. 70, at 475 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982)).
193 Id.
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deliberative process in Congress "nothing but our national interest
can draw us into war."194 The Framers knew, as we should, that when
presidents unleash the war power, "promptitude of decision is oftener
an evil than a benefit."
194 2 Elliot, supra note 25, at 528.
